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 and Evan Van Dyk
**
 
This volume of the Supreme Court Law Review, which consists of 
papers presented at Osgoode Hall Law School’s 8th Annual Constitu-
tional Cases Conference held on April 15, 2005, examines the constitu-
tional decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada released in the 
calendar year 2004.1 The Court handed down a total of 78 judgments in 
2004,2 19 (or 24 per cent) of which were constitutional cases.3 As in 
previous years, the majority (17 out of 19) of the constitutional  
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1
  A case is defined as a “constitutional case” if the decision of the Court involves the in-
terpretation or application of a provision of the “Constitution of Canada,” as defined in s. 52 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
2
  Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings: Special Edition, Statistics 1994-
2004, available online at <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/information/statistics/HTML/cat4_e.asp>. 
3
  The 19 constitutional decisions handed down in calendar year 2004 were as follows: 
Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 71, [2004] 
3 S.C.R. 657 [hereinafter “Auton”]; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 [hereinafter “Canadian 
Foundation”]; Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine 
(Village), [2004] S.C.J. No. 45, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650 [hereinafter “Lafontaine”]; Haida Nation v. 
British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 [hereinafter 
“Haida”]; Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 [here-
inafter “Harper”]; Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] S.C.J. 
No. 60, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357 [hereinafter “Hodge”]; Martineau v. Canada (Minister of National 
Revenue-M.N.R.), [2004] S.C.J. No. 58, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 737 [hereinafter “Martineau”]; Gilles E. 
Néron Communication Marketing Inc. v. Chambre des notaires du Québec, [2004] S.C.J. No. 50, 
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 95 [hereinafter “Néron”]; Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Newfoundland and 
Labrador Assn. of Public and Private Employees (N.A.P.E.), [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 
381 [hereinafter “NAPE”]; R. v. Demers, [2004] S.C.J. No. 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489 [hereinafter 
“Demers”]; R. v. Fontaine, [2004] S.C.J. No. 23, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 702 [hereinafter “Fontaine”]; R. 
v. Lyttle, [2004] S.C.J. No. 8, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193 [hereinafter “Lyttle”]; R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. 
No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 [hereinafter “Mann”]; R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 
S.C.R. 432 [hereinafter “Tessling”]; Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), [2004] 
S.C.J. No. 40, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248 [hereinafter “S. 83.28 Application”]; Vancouver Sun (Re), 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 [hereinafter “Vancouver Sun”]; Reference re Same-Sex 
Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 [hereinafter “Same-Sex Marriage Reference”]; 
Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 [hereinafter “Syndicat 
Northcrest”]; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 69, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 [hereinafter “Taku River”]. 
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decisions were Charter cases. Two of these Charter cases also dealt with 
federalism issues,4 while a further two cases dealt with Aboriginal 
rights. 
I. CHARTER CASES 
The McLachlin Court continues to be receptive to Charter claims, 
though less so in 2004 than in 2003, with seven out of 17 (or 41 per 
cent) of the Charter claims heard succeeding. Since McLachlin J. be-
came Chief Justice on January 7, 2000, 39 out of a total 79 (49 per cent) 
Charter claims have succeeded. While demonstrating a small decline 
from 2003, this still represents a marked increase from the success rate 
of 24 per cent (31 out of 90 cases) seen between 1996 and 1999, and the 
32 per cent success rate (86 out of 264 cases) seen in the 1991-1995 
period. 
1. Equality Rights 20th Anniversary 
With April 17, 2005 marking the 20th anniversary of the coming in-
to force of section 15 of the Charter, three articles in the volume look 
back at the development of equality jurisprudence over this period. Each 
author offers a different perspective on this jurisprudence: Peter Hogg5 
is critical of the Court’s development of the test for a violation of 
equality rights; Donna Greschner6 notes the strength of Canadian juris-
prudence in this area, particularly in contrast with the American experi-
ence; and Judy Rebick7 places herself between Hogg and Greschner in 
tracing both the positive and negative political effects of section 15 over 
the past 20 years. 
                                                                                                                                
4
  Federalism issues were considered in Demers (Criminal Code provisions dealing with 
accused found unfit to stand trial upheld under federal Criminal law power) and the Same-Sex 
Marriage Reference (federal provision stating that officials of religious groups may refuse to 
perform marriages not in accordance with their religious beliefs found ultra vires as encroaching on 
provincial power over solemnization of marriage under s. 92(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867). 
These federalism issues are not considered in any detail by the essays in this volume.  
5
  “What is Equality? The Winding Course of Judicial Interpretation” (2005), of this vol-
ume, at 39. 
6
  “Praise and Promises” (2005), of this volume, at 63. 
7
  “The Political Impact of the Charter” (2005), of this volume, at 85. 
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Hogg views the Law8 test for violations of equality rights as a whol-
ly negative development. Three particular criticisms that have been 
made of the “human dignity” criterion are offered: it is vague, offering 
very little substance as a test; it confuses the distinction between section 
15 and section 1 by introducing an evaluative judgment at the prelimi-
nary stage; and it increases the burden on claimants by raising the 
threshold to be met before the government is forced to defend its legisla-
tion. Pointing out that the “contextual factor” of correspondence — an 
inquiry into legitimacy of purpose and reasonableness of action — has 
come to be the dominant factor in section 15 cases and that section 1 has 
been used only once to justify legislation since the advent of the Law 
test, Hogg argues that the Court should move back towards an Andrews-
like9 approach, which would show greater respect for the boundary 
between the two provisions. 
Donna Greschner offers 15 points about the section 15 jurispru-
dence and, in doing so, provides a positive assessment of its develop-
ment. For Greschner the Canadian judiciary’s treatment of gay and 
lesbian rights, its rejection of originalism, its embrace of lessons from 
international jurisprudence and its application of a progressive interpre-
tation of the Constitution (all in contrast to American developments) are 
reasons for celebration. However, Greschner questions how far the 
Court will be able to go in improving positive liberty in areas such as 
poverty reduction. In agreement with Hogg, Greschner recognizes the 
problems with the Law test, and suggests that it might be improved by 
developing different criteria for different types of discrimination. Final-
ly, Greschner wonders about the inability or unwillingness of women’s 
groups to rely on section 28 of the Charter, particularly in the NAPE 
case this year. 
Judy Rebick examines the Charter’s effects from a political perspec-
tive. Whatever the legal impact, Rebick argues, section 15’s political 
impact has been undeniably positive and is witnessed in the mobiliza-
tion of women, disabled people, visible minorities and Aboriginals into 
a unique coalition. Again using the American experience as a reference 
point, Rebick notes the strength of the women’s movement in Canada 
through the 1980s and 1990s. Like Greschner, Rebick also questions 
                                                                                                                                
8
  Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, 
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497. 
9
  Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. 
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why section 28 has not been used by women’s groups and asks why the 
Charter has not done more for visible minorities over the past 20 years. 
2. Equality Rights 
With judgments in Canadian Foundation, Hodge, Auton, NAPE and 
the Same-Sex Marriage Reference, the Supreme Court’s section 15 
docket was characteristically busy in 2004. In our view, the Court also 
made significant progress in 2004 in clarifying or simplifying equality 
rights analysis. For example, in Hodge the Court makes it clear that 
section 15 analysis must involve a comparison between the claimants 
and a relevant comparator group; moreover, the Court clarifies that the 
selection of a comparator group is ultimately a question of law for the 
courts. Thus, although the claimants can and should suggest a relevant 
comparator group, this suggestion cannot be determinative. In Hodge a 
former common law spouse had sought to compare herself to married 
separated spouses for purposes of claiming CPP survivor benefits. The 
Court found that the relevant comparator group is actually divorced 
spouses, a group that was not entitled to CPP benefits. Thus there was 
no denial of a benefit and no discrimination for purposes of section 15. 
We regard this clarification as both helpful and important. 
The Auton case is also significant because it clarifies that denial of 
equal treatment must operate “by law”; moreover, in determining 
whether this requirement has been satisfied it is important and essential 
to have regard to the precise terms of the statutory scheme in question. 
The section 15 claim advanced in this case was premised on the belief 
that the scheme guaranteed everyone funding for all “medically neces-
sary” services. The Court found that this premise was incorrect, since 
the scheme was designed to fund “core services” only. The Court also 
noted that the proper comparator group in this case was to those persons 
seeking funding for therapy that was “emergent and only recently be-
coming recognized”. Taking this comparator group into account, there 
was no evidence that the B.C. government had been any less receptive 
to the claim for autism therapy funding than for other comparable 
claims. 
The Court’s analysis in these cases is clear, well reasoned and unan-
imous. The vague concept of “human dignity”, which had been rightly 
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criticized since its emergence in the Law case10 as failing to provide any 
determinacy to equality rights analysis, plays a secondary role in the 
analysis. The Court seems to be clearing away the confusion that has 
plagued its equality rights analysis over much of the past decade, which 
we regard as very encouraging.  
Essays in this volume focus in particular on Auton, NAPE and the 
Same-Sex Marriage Reference,11 key section 15 decisions in the latter 
half of 2004. Papers by Geoffrey Cowper, and by Christopher Manfredi 
and Antonia Maioni focus on Auton, which reversed lower court deci-
sions concluding that autistic children are constitutionally entitled to 
costly health care services. In discussing the communitarian themes that 
can be found in this year’s section 15 jurisprudence, Roslyn Levine and 
Jonathan Penney provide broader reflections on the evolution of section 
15. Elsewhere in this volume, Jamie Cameron adds to the commentary 
on NAPE; further analysis of the Same-Sex Marriage Reference is pro-
vided by Jamie Cameron and Bruce Ryder. 
Geoffrey Cowper12 argues that the Auton decision reflects a trend in 
the Supreme Court of deciding equality claims which challenge social 
programs on narrow legal grounds, rather than on broader principles of 
social policy. He questions the impact of the factual record in cases 
where it conflicts with deeply held social views. Cowper’s analysis 
leads him to state that while the Court allows governments to balance 
societal and individual interests, this balancing act cannot be used to 
justify irrational and arbitrary distinctions under section 15. 
With reference again to Auton, Christopher P. Manfredi and Antonia 
Maioni13 examine litigation’s potential as an instrument of health policy 
reform. Two basic claims have recently been made: the first argues that 
there is little evidence that litigation has been a useful tool of social 
policy reform; the second claims that even without direct positive  
effects, rights litigation can have important long-term political effects by 
                                                                                                                                
10
  Id., note 8. 
11
  Though it is discussed by Roslyn Levine and Jonathan Penney, Canadian Foundation 
was decided early in 2004 and was addressed by last year’s conference. See P. Burstein, “What’s 
the Harm in Having a ‘Harm Principle’ Enshrined in Section 7 of the Charter?” (2004) 24 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 160; R. Levine, “In Harm’s Way: The Limits to Legislating Criminal Law”, id., at 195; and J. 
Benedet, “Hierarchies of Harm in Canadian Criminal Law: The Marijuana Trilogy and the Forcible 
‘Correction’ of Children”, id., at 217. 
12
  “Equality Rights and Social Benefit Programs” (2005), of this volume, at 93. 
13
  “Reversal of Fortune: Litigating Health Care Reform in Auton v. British Columbia” 
(2005), of this volume, at 111. 
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empowering marginalized groups. Manfredi and Maioni use the Auton 
decision to show that the results in such cases have been mixed. While 
Auton mobilized groups around the country and spawned widespread 
litigation and high levels of public support, the cases, in the end (with 
the Supreme Court ruling) have changed no legal rules. The authors 
warn that using litigation as a tool of health care policy reform results in 
sophisticated queue-jumping by prioritizing certain treatments, reducing 
complex policy issues to two-party disputes and, when litigation is suc-
cessful, imposing national solutions on local problems. 
Although the tradition in Canadian equality jurisprudence has been 
to view the rights protected by section 15 as individual rights and leave 
the concept of communitarian standards to section 1, Roslyn Levine and 
Jonathon Penney14 demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s equality rights 
decisions in 2004 have applied communitarian concerns — previously 
seen only in dissenting opinions — at the section 15 stage of the analy-
sis. The shift away from the subjective element of human dignity analy-
sis, the Court’s substitution of the comparator group in Hodge and the 
linking of the denial of the right to the provision in the Newfoundland 
pay equity case reflect this shift away from a preoccupation with indi-
vidualistic conceptions of equality rights. 
3. Freedom of Religion 
The Charter’s guarantee of religious freedom has been quiet in re-
cent years but was brought to the forefront in 2004 with two decisions 
from Quebec: Lafontaine and Syndicat Northcrest. Meanwhile, gay 
marriage engaged section 15 and section 2(a) at the same time and chal-
lenged the Supreme Court, in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference, to 
consider whether there are conflicts between the two guarantees. Bruce 
Ryder’s paper on religious neutrality is followed by Richard Moon’s 
discussion of Syndicat Northcrest, and David Brown provides a com-
ment on both papers. 
Starting from the point of view that religion and conscience are im-
portant positive goods, Bruce Ryder15 argues that while the Charter 
                                                                                                                                
14
  “The Evolving Approach to Section 15(1): Diminished Rights or Bolder Communities?” 
(2005), of this volume, at 137. 
15
  “State Neutrality and Freedom of Conscience and Religion” (2005), of this volume, at 
169. 
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imposes a duty of religious neutrality on the state, this duty requires the 
state to be neutral as between religions and not to be neutral about reli-
gion. In fact, in Lafontaine, Ryder argues, the Court might have seized 
the opportunity to place on governments a positive obligation to foster 
religious activity, so long as such assistance is extended equally to all 
religious groups. In discussing the Same-Sex Marriage Reference, Ryder 
notes that the state cannot refuse to take a position on policy issues 
which have a religious dimension; rather, its obligation is to determine 
the validity of state laws based on constitutional norms rather than on 
religious doctrine (a test by which the common law definition of mar-
riage fails). Finally, Ryder predicts that the majority judgment in 
Syndicat Northcrest may open the door to an expansive interpretation of 
freedom of conscience in the future, though the Court’s apparent divi-
sion on religious issues suggests that these matters will be debated again 
in the coming years. 
In criticizing the Court’s ruling in Syndicat Northcrest, Richard 
Moon16 highlights the tension between two competing points of view: 
one is that both religious and non-religious beliefs and practices are a 
matter of individual autonomy protected by a single freedom (“freedom 
of conscience and religion”); the other is that religious beliefs and prac-
tices merit an additional level of protection over non-religious beliefs 
due to their way of connecting the individual to a community and identi-
ty. Moon argues that the majority’s favouring of the second principle 
privileges religious beliefs over secular beliefs when these come into 
conflict with the larger public interest. The Court’s attempt to balance 
both of these competing principles (Moon suggests that to take sides 
may in any case be impossible), is reflected in tensions over the scope of 
the freedom, the nature of the wrong addressed by the freedom, the 
place of religion in public debate and the character of public secularism.  
David Brown17 builds his comment on the framework of the tensions 
identified by Moon. He rejects the suggestion that the Court’s ruling in 
Syndicat Northcrest has privileged religious beliefs over non-religious 
matters of conscience. In particular, he argues that with the lack of ju-
risprudence on freedom of conscience, it is difficult to predict how the 
                                                                                                                                
16
  “Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem” (2005), of this 
volume, at 201. 
17
  “Neutrality or Privilege? A Comment on Religious Freedom” (2005), of this volume, at 
221. 
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Court might treat these matters. Brown claims that it was necessary to 
protect non-mandatory religious practices in order to reflect the reality 
of religions as practised by their adherents. Finally, he rejects the idea 
that there is a dichotomy between protecting religious beliefs as freely 
and individually chosen, and protecting them as cultural characteristics. 
Since protection under both of these justifications can be found in sec-
tion 2(a) and section 15 of the Charter, the challenge is to develop a 
jurisprudence of limitation that allows the Court to balance sensitivity 
toward conscientious conviction with the ability of the community to 
place reasonable limits on religious beliefs. 
4. Freedom of Expression 
Harper v. Canada was one of the Supreme Court’s most significant 
decisions under section 2(b) in recent years. There, a majority held that 
Parliament’s third party spending limits, which apply during federal 
election campaigns, are a justifiable restriction on freedom of expres-
sion. This section of the conference publication includes three papers on 
this issue, by Colin Feasby, Christopher Bredt and Richard Haigh. Their 
contributions are followed by Mark Freiman’s discussion of Néron v. 
C.B.C. and the law of defamation. It should also be noted that the Court 
decided a third significant case on freedom of expression, in the context 
of the open court principle; its decision in Vancouver Sun arose under 
Parliament’s Anti-terrorism Act and is discussed by David Paciocco’s 
paper on the Charter and the criminal law. 
In examining the Harper decision, the three commentators conclud-
ed that the Supreme Court’s Charter analysis of third party election 
spending limits is plagued by shortcomings. Colin Feasby18 argues that 
the Court’s failure to recognize the potential for politicians to abuse 
election rules led it to take an approach that was overly deferential. 
While the Court accepted the government’s stated objective of levelling 
the playing field in election campaigns, a more rigorous and sceptical 
inquiry of the government’s objective would have enabled the Court to 
investigate whether election finance legislation is in fact aimed at main-
taining the political status quo, thereby curtailing the agenda-setting 
                                                                                                                                
18
  “Freedom of Expression and the Law of the Democratic Process” (2005), of this vol-
ume, at 237. 
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function of issue-advocacy groups and shielding politicians from criti-
cism. Feasby also agrees that while the nature of the election campaign 
may require special rules, the Court in Harper extended its deference to 
legislation affecting expression outside of the campaign, an area in 
which such deference cannot be justified. 
Along the same lines, Christopher Bredt and Laura Pottie19 agree 
that a healthy dose of judicial scepticism is particularly warranted for 
regulations that restrict advocacy in the electoral context. They cite a 
tendency for Parliament to enact legislation that preserves the status 
quo, and argue that there is a clear need to keep this tendency toward 
“self-interested regulation” in check. By posing a number of examples, 
they also point to the flaws of the egalitarian model, which was adopted 
by the majority opinion in Harper. 
Richard Haigh20 argues that the Court has not probed the nature of 
political advertising, as compared with commercial advertising. The 
question of election financing is one part of a larger problem of fair 
elections, rooted in unequal access to the media, the narrowing of politi-
cal debate and the influence of wealth in politics. In fact, Haigh ques-
tions whether, in this era of more subtly applied political tactics 
favouring wealthy parties, election spending limits can do anything 
more than pacify voters, reassuring them of the surface fairness of the 
electoral system. In embracing a deferential approach to Parliament, 
however, the Court may have foreclosed the opportunity to examine 
these issues in greater depth in the future. 
Examining another aspect of freedom of expression, Mark Freiman21 
argues that the Court’s decision in the defamation case of Néron v. CBC 
sets a new low-water mark for the protection of expression which, alt-
hough applying directly only in Quebec, might have important implica-
tions in the common law provinces as well. By applying a test of 
professional journalistic standards that is incapable of providing a 
framework for balancing the public interest with the private interest of 
the plaintiff, the Court has contradicted the balancing act required by 
                                                                                                                                
19
  “Liberty, Equality and Deference: A Comment on Colin Feasby’s ‘Freedom of Expres-
sion and the Law of the Democratic Process’ ” (2005), of this volume, at 291. 
20
  “He Hath a Heart for Harping: Stephen Harper and Election Spending in a Spendthrift 
Age” (2005), of this volume, at 305 
21
  “The Public Law Consequences of Private Disputes: Néron v. CBC and the Law of Def-
amation” (2005), of this volume, at 321. 
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Hill v. Church of Scientology22 when imposing limits on expressive 
freedom. The Court’s use of “wrongful pruning” as a concept in exam-
ining the truth of a media broadcast might also have important implica-
tions for the common law defences of truth and fair comment in 
defamation cases. 
5. Legal Rights 
Alan Young comments on the Supreme Court’s key decisions on the 
Charter’s legal rights in 2004 which, apart from Canadian Foundation, 
were Mann and Tessling. In addition, the Court considered the constitu-
tionality of the Anti-terrorism Act’s investigative hearing; though the 
Court upheld the provision in Section 83.28 Application, it strongly 
endorsed the open court principle in Vancouver Sun. Despite that en-
dorsement, David Paciocco’s paper expresses concerns about the in-
crease in government secrecy that has been provoked by terrorism. Scott 
Hutchison comments on both papers. 
Citing several recent appeal court decisions correcting clear-cut sec-
tion 8 violations, Alan Young23 asks why this provision has seemingly 
had so little effect on the practice of policing. According to Young, the 
Supreme Court’s two recent decisions in this area give little hope that 
this will change. By setting out vague standards for the use of new sur-
veillance technology in Tessling, and by approving searches in the con-
text of investigative detention in Mann, but refusing to outline limits on 
this new police power, Young argues that the Court has failed to provide 
clear guidance to the police. By not establishing clear limits these deci-
sions make it difficult for the police, who are obligated to respect the 
rights of Canadians under section 8 of the Charter, as well impair any 
“dialogue” between the Courts and Parliament in determining the scope 
of police powers in relation to search and seizure rights. 
David Paciocco24 outlines recent developments in the area of the 
“open court” principle by examining how the government and the legal 
community have responded to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001. The best way to ensure a proper balance between the interests of 
openness and security is to maintain a healthy commitment to appropri-
                                                                                                                                
22
  Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130. 
23
  “Search and Seizure in 2004 — Dialogue or Dead-End?” (2005), of this volume, at 351. 
24
  “When Open Courts Meet Closed Government” (2005), of this volume, at 385. 
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ate norms among those responsible for defining and administering these 
laws. However, recent provisions, including amendments to section 38 
of the Canada Evidence Act, and sections 83 and 486 of the Criminal 
Code, cause Paciocco to doubt whether this commitment is deep 
enough. Nonetheless, he finds some cause for hope in the Supreme 
Court’s strong defence of open courts in Vancouver Sun (Re). 
Scott Hutchison’s25 comment suggests that the Court’s decision in 
Tessling has struck an appropriate balance between the individual’s 
interest in privacy and society’s interest in law enforcement. Rather than 
simply erect barriers to investigation, the Court has applied a purposive 
approach in interpreting section 8. Hutchison also notes that search and 
seizure law has become far too complex to be effectively followed by 
police and that more clarity and coherence will enhance respect for the 
Constitution by police and other state actors. Finally, in response to 
Paciocco, Hutchison agrees that institutional culture is essential in pro-
tecting openness of the courts; however, he observes that it may be more 
realistic to develop a culture of openness in routine policing than in a 
national security context, an arena in which the stakes are unavoidably 
raised.  
II. ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 
The Court examined Aboriginal rights in two important cases in 
2004 in the Haida Nation and Taku River decisions, both written by 
McLachlin C.J.C. for a unanimous Court. In these cases, the Court out-
lined the extent of the Crown’s obligation to consult with Aboriginal 
groups before authorizing activities in cases where the existence of 
Aboriginal rights has not yet been established. Brian Slattery and Ria 
Tzimas examine how these cases fit into the broader development of 
Aboriginal rights jurisprudence, while Kent McNeil looks at whether 
provincial governments even have the authority to infringe on Aborigi-
nal lands, thereby undercutting the duty to consult outlined by the Court. 
Brian Slattery26 argues that the Haida Nation and Taku River deci-
sions are an affirmation of the principle of the honour of the Crown 
                                                                                                                                
25
  “Knowledge is Power: The Criminal Law, Openness and Privacy” (2005), of this vol-
ume, at 419. 
26
  “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005), of this volume, at 433. 
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outlined in section 35 interpretation since the Sparrow27 case. This prin-
ciple points simultaneously to a need for both litigation and negotiation. 
Litigation can be used by native groups to demonstrate the existence of 
historical rights, but under the Haida Nation paradigm, negotiation 
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples can create new, modern 
iterations of generic rights, resulting in a generative and dynamic role 
for section 35 in which the Crown has an ongoing duty to identify Abo-
riginal rights in a contemporary form. 
Kent McNeil’s28 article questions the legitimacy of the “duty to con-
sult” placed on the British Columbia government. Through an examina-
tion of the powers vested in provincial governments by the Constitution 
and the Indian Act,29 McNeil demonstrates that the authority of the B.C. 
government to infringe on the lands in question — a logical prerequisite 
of the duty to consult — may not exist. Since Aboriginal title has not yet 
been demonstrated over the lands in question, the British Columbia 
government may in the future have the authority it seeks, but in the 
meantime, any government action would later be open to a claim of 
wrongful intrusion. 
Rather than viewing the Haida Nation and Taku River decisions as 
representing a major change on questions of jurisdiction, Ria Tzimas30 
argues that the Court’s decisions fit into a broader context of reconcilia-
tion, which can be traced to the Quebec Secession Reference.31 Howev-
er, Tzimas questions the possibility of achieving reconciliation through 
the prescribed course of negotiation, the ability of the parties (not only 
governments and Aboriginal groups but other interested parties) to find 
common ground and the potential for helpful interim agreements to be 
created while parties negotiate towards ultimate reconciliation. 
                                                                                                                                
27
  R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. 
28
  “Aboriginal Rights, Resource Development, and the Source of the Provincial Duty to 
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  R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. 
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III. KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
In his contribution, Michael Ignatieff32 urges academics not to be si-
lent in the face of our current political crisis, one which will have a 
profound impact on national unity. Canadian federalism, due to the 
diverse character of our country, is a continual process of self-
justification and self-invention, in which academics must take responsi-
bility for leadership in constantly re-articulating what Canada stands for. 
Only by improving federalism, particularly through re-thinking our 
current models of fiscal federalism, can we face the challenge of separa-
tism. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The 2004 year saw a number of important developments in Charter 
and Aboriginal rights jurisprudence. Yet 2004 was also a year of signifi-
cant change for the Court, with Iacobucci and Arbour JJ., both of whom 
had emerged as key figures on the Court in recent years, retiring in June 
2004. Indeed, a core group of Chief Justice McLachlin and Iacobucci, 
Arbour and Fish JJ. were key to the majorities in a number of contested 
5-4 decisions in early 2004. With Abella and Charron JJ. joining the 
Court in late 2004, four of nine justices have been members for three 
years or less and, barring unexpected early retirements, the relatively 
youthful Court is entering a period where we can expect stability in its 
membership.33 It will therefore be important in 2005 and beyond to 
assess whether the recently reconstituted Supreme Court attempts to 
shift the Court’s constitutional analysis in new or different directions.  
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  “Keynote Address: Law and Politics in the Canadian Constitutional Tradition” (2005), 
of this volume, at 29. 
33
  Apart from Major J., who will retire in December 2005, no other retirements from the 
Court are scheduled until 2013. 
 
